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Obligations of the New Occupier: The
Contours of a Jus Post Bellum
BY KRISTEN E. BOON*
I. INTRODUCTION
A pressing task for international lawyers is to define the legal
regime that applies during transitions from conflict to peace. The
urgency of this project has become apparent with recent
humanitarian interventions, multilateral state-building exercises,
and the transformative occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.'
Although each intervention has given rise to a unique set of
problems and has involved different sets of actors, contemporary
approaches to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are
similar. Many have involved extensive legal reform, the promotion
of democratic institutions, economic reconstruction, and the
creation of mechanisms to establish accountability for past
atrocities.' There is, however, no uniform legal framework
regulating transitions from conflict to peace, nor is there consensus
on the obligations that unilateral or multilateral actors incur when
they engage in transformative occupations and interventions.
Theories of jus post bellum, or law after war, are emerging to fill
this lacuna.3
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1. GREGORY H. Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 8-12 (2008) [hereinafter Fox,
HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION] (discussing the scope and legal frameworks of
contemporary interventions).
2. Id. at 49-50 (discussing the common tasks and objectives of second generation
peacebuilding missions).
3. Carsten Stahn, 'Jus Ad Bellum', 'Jus In Bello'. .. 'Jus Post Bellum'?-Rethinking
the Conception of the Law of Armed Forces, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 921, 941-943 (2006)
(describing the tripartite nature of the law of armed force).
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Jus post bellum derives its name from two existing bodies of
law: jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which are applicable,
respectively, to the initiation of war and to conduct in war.' These
bodies of law have been codified in various legal instruments
including the UN Charter, national military manuals, and the laws
on armed conflict, such as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
and their Additional Protocols. Yet with the exception of the law
of belligerent occupation, neither jus ad bellum nor jus in bello
provide much guidance on temporary interventions after war and
before peace.5 The illusion that war and peace are absolute,
constituting a binary system, has stymied the growth of legal
principles in this transitional stage.6 Georg Schwartzenberger
noted this fact in 1948 when he wrote: "[T]he traditional system of
international law is based on the distinction between the law of
peace and the law of war. In the formative period of international
law, thinkers were fully aware of the problems hidden behind this
classification." 7
Distinct legal issues arise during the transitional period
between the cessation of war and the establishment of a durable
peace. Do those exercising temporary power have a right or an
obligation to reform national laws and institutions? Is a new
constitution required as part of the longer term peace process, and
if so, how will ethnic, geographic, religious, and economic tensions
be reconciled? Must natural resources be federalized or subject to
international management schemes, particularly where they have
contributed to conflict? Should international authorities protect
housing, land, and property rights? Should victims of crimes
4. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5-18
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing the historical development of the doctrines);
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (4th ed. 2000).
5. Stahn, Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Forces, supra note 3, at
927 ("[T]he traditional rules of jus in bello are therefore only partially equipped to address
the problems arising in the context of peace-making and the transition from armed conflict
to peace."). See generally Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
6. GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED
RIVALRIES 7 (Harvard Univ. Press 2007) ("[T]he binary model of war and peace often no
longer appropriately captures what we, sometimes dimly, grasp as the constantly changing
political reality of our lives. The darker aspects of globalization and interdependence
breed-alongside cooperation and growth-new enemies, new weapons, and new
vulnerabilities. We are no longer sure at all times when either peace or war is occurring.").
7. Georg Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 470 (1943)
(discussing the "status mixtus" between war and peace).
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committed during conflict be compensated, and if so, by whom?
These questions are particularly salient where occupiers and
International Organizations (1Os) have a transformative goal, i.e,
where the object of the post-conflict intervention is to make
violent societies peaceful by engaging in political reform and
economic development.
Transformative approaches to peacebuilding have revealed
profound inadequacies in the current legal framework, and
principles of international law have not developed sufficiently to
fill the gaps. Neither the Charters of the UN, IMF, or World Bank,
nor the law of occupation (codified in the Geneva Conventions
and the Hague Regulations) are sufficient in and of themselves to
provide general principles on transitional interventions to build
the peace. These inadequacies have created complexities on the
ground because the .duties and obligations of the various
international actors are uneven and often unclear.
In this article, I assess whether the law of occupation is a
workable point of departure for a jus post bellum. I then comment
on what theory of peace informs jus post bellum, and I conclude
with some suggestions on the scope and content of a jus post
bellum, emphasizing the role of human rights, multilateralism, and
economic reconstruction. In particular, I argue that jus post bellum
should be based on the emerging norms of accountability,
stewardship, good economic governance, and proportionality. Jus
post bellum triggers principles in play in periods after armed
conflict, moving away from war (ab bello) towards justice (ad
jusitiam) and peace (ad pacem).' Jus post bellum expands the
traditional binary rules of international law into a tripartite system,
which will bring the law into closer conformity with the challenges
presented by the peace-making, peacebuilding, and post-conflict
practices of today.9
8. This analysis focuses on the stages between armed conflict and peace, although
some of the principles may be applicable by analogy to natural disasters. See, e.g., U.N.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of
Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/598 (May 5, 2008) (by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special
Rapporteur).
9. Philip Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between
War and Peace? 48 AM. J. INT'L LAW. 98, 102 (1954) (discussing the state of intermediacy
between war and peace and how its acceptance would bring the law into closer conformity
with the facts of international life).
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II. THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: A FOUNDATION FOR JUS POST
BELLUM
International humanitarian law (IHL) and, specifically, the
Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 are the traditional touchstones for identifying what legal
obligations obtain when territory comes under the control and
administration of a foreign presence. '° The ICJ has stated that the
trigger for the law of occupation is a showing of de facto control:
territory is considered occupied when it is placed under the
effective control of a hostile army." Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations makes clear that occupation does not confer
sovereignty on the occupying power, thus during an occupation,
the sovereignty of the occupied state becomes dormant, while the
occupier exercises de facto ruling authority in recognition of the
ongoing, but displaced .sovereignty of the state.12 Occupiers are
therefore obliged to protect the civilian population, by acting as
trustees and reserving fundamental political and legal changes to
future governments representing the occupied population. 13 This
10. See generally Hague Convention IV: Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; Geneva IV,
supra note 5.
11. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reports 136, 78 (July 9)
("[T]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has
been established and can be exercised."). See also Hague Convention IV, supra note 10,
art. XLIII. It is important to note that no actual showing of armed conflict is required; Art,
2(2) of the Geneva IV provides that the Convention shall apply "even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance." Geneva IV, supra note 5, art. 2(2).
12. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 8 n.9
(Princeton University Press 2003) [hereinafter BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION];
Daphna Shraga, Military Occupation and UN Transitional Administrations- The Analogy
and Its Limitations, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 479, 481 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2007);
Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the
Contemporary Occupant's Law Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 296 (2005)
[hereinafter Boon, Legislative Reform].
13. The conservationist principle is illustrated by Article 43 of the Hague Regulation
which requires that the Occupying Power "[respect], unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the country." Hague Convention IV, supra note 10, at art. 43. Rudiger
Wolfrum, The Adequacy of International Humanitarian Law Rules on Belligerent
Occupation: To What Extent May Security Council Resolution 1483 Be Considered a Model
for Adjustment?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE
FAULTLINES 497, 498 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2007). Cf. Fox, HUMANITARIAN
OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 29-33 (arguing that the mandate system did not require the
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principle has been described as one of "conservationism," which
involves three presumptions: occupations are temporary, non-
transformative, and limited in scope.14
This fundamental premise, that occupiers will conserve the
status quo ante of an occupied territory, has in practice, been
demonstrated to be a fiction. 5 The 2003 invasion and occupation
of Iraq provided confirmation, if any was needed, that the core
principle of "conservationism" has been seriously compromised. 6
Although the United States and the United Kingdom reluctantly
recognized their status as occupying powers in Iraq, they
embarked on an aggressive campaign to reform domestic laws and
institutions. " During the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA)
fourteen months in existence, it enacted twelve regulations, one
hundred orders, and issued seventeen explanatory memoranda on
subjects ranging from domestic criminal law to tax reform. 1
Economic development was a clear priority for the CPA, as
evidenced by the multitude of reforms targeting the economy,
including legal changes, the direct involvement of the World Bank
and IMF in the reconstruction effort, and in the CPA's efforts to
promotion of political rights or self-government and that there was very little international
oversight).
14. Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
721, 726 (2005) (describing occupation as a temporary state of fact); Christopher
Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law, in THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY 241, 265-66 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992)
(describing the temporary authority of occupiers); Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION,
supra note 1, at 235.
15. Hillary Charlesworth, Law After War, 8 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 233, n.40 (2007).
16. Some occupations have had limited purposes. See BENVENISTI, LAW OF
OCCUPATION, supra note 12 (discussing the Coalition Occupation of Southern and
Northern Iraq and the Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon). For a discussion of the
principle of conservationism in prolonged occupation, see Adam Roberts, Prolonged
Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44
(1990) (stating that even in a prolonged occupation, occupying powers must avoid making
drastic changes).
17. See generally Boon, Legislative Reform, supra note 12 (discussing legislative
reform in Iraq under the CPA and comparing it to the legislative reform that took place in
East Timor and Kosovo under UN Interim Administrations). It was somewhat surprising,
as Hillary Charlesworth notes, that the United Kingdom and United States agreed to the
status of occupier. Charlesworth, supra note 15, at n.40.
18. Boon, Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 308; COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4 (2004),
http://www.cpa-iraq.org.
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improve infrastructure and manage natural resources in Iraq. "
Institutional changes were vast as well;- the process of "de-
Ba'athification" of Iraqi society involved the elimination of party
structures and government ministries that were used to "oppress
the Iraqi people and as institutions of torture, repression and
corruption."' As General Tommy Franks notoriously proclaimed
upon entering Baghdad, "this is about liberation, not
occupation." 2
It would be a mistake, however, to view the United States and
United Kingdom's transformative intervention in Iraq as unique.
The sweeping social and institutional reforms that took place in
both Japan and Germany after WWII tell a similar story.22 The
Allies' main goal during the post-war occupation of Japan and
Germany was the eradication of existing national institutions and
the establishment of democratic ones in their stead.' The
conservationist principle had thus been deftly circumvented long
before the 2003 occupation of Iraq. 2
The mismatch between the spirit of IHL applicable to
belligerent occupation and the practice of contemporary occupiers
is one of the central reasons why the law of occupation is criticized
today. As Grant Harris writes: "The international law of
occupation has become essentially irrelevant as a force that
19. Kristen E. Boon, Open for Business: International Financial Institutions, Post-
Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 533-38
(2007) [hereinafter Boon, Open for Business].
20. Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 261 (internal citation
omitted).
21. Katherine Butler & Donald Macintyre, General Franks Strides Into His Baghdad
Palace, THE INDEP., Apr. 17, 2003, available at http:/lwww.independent.co.uk/news/world/
middle-east/general-franks-strides-into-his-baghdad-palace-594752.html. See also
Charlesworth, supra note 15 (noting that the invasion was intended to create a turning
point for democracy not only in Iraq, but also in the Middle East in general).
22. The occupations of Germany and Japan took place before the Geneva
Conventions were codified. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 provided the
principal source of regulation, stating that the occupier shall restore order and safety while
respecting the laws in force. Hague Convention IV, supra note 10, at art. 43. See Fox,
HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 259 (illustrating why some argued the
Hague Regulations did not apply to these occupations).
23. BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 91.
24. Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 585 (2006) (discussing annexation as a
precursor to transformative occupation) [hereinafter Roberts, Transformative Military
Occupation]. See Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 233-35 (noting
that it was ironic that the concept was reconfirmed in Article 64 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949).
[Vol. 31:57
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compels action by occupying powers. Occupants rarely comply
with the letter or spirit of that body of law. As a result, the law of
occupation's legal authority and status are uncertain.""
The majority of scholars and states today consider the law of
occupation to be inadequate to the realities of modern occupation,
and to the demands of modern peacebuilding and post-conflict
reconstruction by analogy.26 While IHL remains an extremely
important and almost universally accepted body of law, there are a
number of reasons why its applicability to modern war-to-peace
transitions is limited. First, occupation law applies to only a subset
of the war-to-peace transitions. For the protections of Geneva IV
to apply, the conflict must be of an international character and the
invader must be a state or foreign army that is actually exercising
authority. 27 Most provisions of Geneva IV do not, therefore, apply
to internal conflicts, to multilateral peacekeeping missions, or to
the period after a formal occupation, but before a stable peace. '
Many nebulous and extended transitions between war and peace
will not, therefore, come within the purview of Geneva IV unless
the relevant parties independently and voluntarily choose to apply
25. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 9
(2006).
26. Id. Stahn, Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Forces, supra note 3, at
928 ("The norms of international humanitarian law are therefore only to a limited extent
relevant to the broader process of building peace after conflict."); Brett H. McGurk,
Revisiting the Law of National-Building: Iraq in Transition, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 451, 453
(2004-2005). But see Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 24 (arguing
that the law of occupation can accommodate modern circumstances of occupation).
27. The obligations in conflicts that are considered "not of an international character"
are significantly less burdensome, as per common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See,
e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 5, art. 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
III]. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442. On the complexities of applying the
"effective control" requirement in Gaza see Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex
Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate, 41 ISR. L. REV. 68, 69-71 (2008).
28. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, however, sets down minimum
standards for conflict not of an international character. For an excellent discussion of the
typology of international occupations and the criteria required to trigger Geneva IV, see
Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 249 (1984)
[hereinafter Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?].
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it.29 As such, the law of occupation addresses only a narrow set of
in bello situations, but does not govern the broader whole.
A second reason why the law of occupation is of limited
applicability to modern war-to-peace situations is that it does not
bind 1Os, such as the UN, the IMF, or the World Bank. 0 This gap
is troublesome because 1Os now play a dominant role in post-
conflict reconstruction for reasons of expertise, legitimacy, burden
sharing, and resources.31 1Os provide technical and humanitarian
assistance;32 and they have been extensively involved in legal
reform.33 In Kosovo and East Timor, the UN even created
transitional administrations with full executive and legislative
authority, illustrating what may be the high water mark of
intervention by 1Os. ' To date however, IHL has not been
embraced by 1Os. To be sure, IOs do not have standing to become
parties to international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. "
Nonetheless, there are parallels between the international
administration of territories and the temporary administration of a
29. See Ian Brownlie, First Report of the Effect of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, T 17,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/552 (Apr. 21, 2005) (contemporary
conflicts are increasingly characterized by civil wars with international assistance). The
Article 2 requirement for a total or partial occupation,. for example, limited the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions after the, CPA's transfer of authority to the
multinational forces in Iraq in June 2004. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IRAQ
POST TRANSFER (2004), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/63KKj8.
30. See Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 222-30. See generally
LAURIE BLANK, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002),
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks42.pdf.
31. KATHARINA P. COLEMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 2-3 (2007).
32. See generally PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT
RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN IRAQ 21-25 (2003), http://ihlresearch.org/iraq/pdfs/IHL IO-Iraq.pdf.
33. See Boon, Open For Business, supra note 19 (discussing the role of the World
Bank and IMF in legal reform).
34. The transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor are examined in
RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: How TRUSTEESHIP
AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY 144-46, 178-88 (2008).
35. Only states, not International Organizations, are a "High Contracting Power," as
per the terms of the Conventions. See David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 842, 852 (2003); Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 222-30.
-Some scholars, however, argue that international humanitarian law should bind
international organizations. See BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at xvi;
BLANK, supra note 30.
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state under a belligerent occupation.6 Yet only the UN has so far
acknowledged that it will respect the principles of IHL during its
operations,37 while the IMF, the World Bank, and other
organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction have resisted
on the basis that their mandates are limited to economic and
financial objectives.
A further limi tation of the law of occupation is that, even
where the law of occupation applies, most occupiers do not
acknowledge that they are bound, whether because they are
interested in permanent control of the territory, because the status
of the territory is disputed, or because they wish to avoid the
considerable burdens and liabilities created by Geneva IV.
Occupiers have engaged in what Benvenisti calls a "pattern of
denial" about the applicability of occupation law.3 9 The law of
occupation requires occupants to care for civilians, provide food
and medical supplies to the population, ensure humane treatment
of protected persons, and prohibit physical and moral coercion."
These factors create an incentive for de facto occupiers to find
reasons why they should not be saddled with the burdens of full
compliance.4 What is more, because there are no effective legal
mechanisms to hold occupiers to account, only the court of public
36. See generally Boon, Legislative Reform, supra note 12. Cf. Shraga, supra note 12,
(on the limits of the analogy and an explanation of why international administrations do
not meet the "effective control" test of belligerent occupation).
37. See The Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/st-sgb-1999_13.pdf. For commentary, see Stephen C. Neff, WAR
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 344-45 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005);
Sylvain Vit6, L'Applicabilitg du Droit International de l'Occupation Militaire aux Activites
des Organisations Internationales, 86 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CROIX ROUGE 9,
21-22 (2004).
38. The IFIs have also taken this position with regard to the applicability of human
rights. See, e.g., Francois Gianviti, Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights and the
International Monetary Fund, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (Philip
Alston, ed., 2008); Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering
the Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 471, 474
(2008); John W. Head, Protecting and Supporting Indigenous Peoples in Latin America:
Evaluating the Recent World Bank and IDB Policy Initiatives, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 383,
408 (2006).
39. BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 149.
40. See, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 5, arts.. 3(1), 31-33, 55. For a discussion of the
security exception, see Boon, Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 302-03.
41. Kathleen Cavanaugh, Rewriting Law: The Case of Israel and the Occupied
Territory, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY
CONFLICTS 227, 239 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005) (discussing
Israel's objections to the applicability of the law of occupation in Gaza).
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opinion creates an incentive for occupiers to abide by its
provisions. 2 In sum, despite the universal ratification of the
Geneva Conventions, IHL is not broad enough to cover the
expansive challenges that arise in contemporary multilateral
occupations and peacebuilding situations.
III. AD PACEM: A MODERN THEORY OF PEACE
The law of belligerent occupation reflects a nineteenth
century laissez-faire view of the state, in that it assumes that the
role of foreign occupiers in the civil, economic, and political
aspects of society is minimal.43 This presumption is outdated.
Today, states are often expected, and sometimes legally obliged, to
play a much more active management role in day-to-day domestic
issues. Similar expectations are created when foreign territories
are administered or occupied by international regimes.
This changing conception of the state is relevant to the jus
post bellum. Whereas war and peace were once defined in
opposition to one another," today it is acknowledged that peace is
not simply created by a de jure agreement like a peace treaty, but
as a normative matter, requires consolidation, such as compliance
with peace agreements, monitoring ceasefires, demilitarization of
former combatants, repatriation of refugees, mine clearance,
economic development, and the reform of police forces. " Under
the UN Charter, peace is no longer limited to a minimalist
negative core but increasingly contains positive duties linked to the
conditions that make peace practicable. 6 Like the positive
42. See Geneva IV, supra note 5, art. 9 (providing for a Protecting Power). See also
BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 204-07 (arguing that the most
effective way of enforcing obligations on occupiers is through regional and international
organizations); Tristan Ferrero, Enforcement of Occupation Law in Domestic Courts:
Issues and Opportunities, 41 ISR. L. REV. 331 (2008).
43. BENVENISTI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 12, at 209.
44. As Hobbes wrote, "for war is nothing else but that time wherein the will and
intention of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently declared; and the
time which is not war, is peace." THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 73
(Ferdinand Tonnies ed., Frank Cass & Co. 2d ed. 1969) (1889) (emphasis added). See also
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 832 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana
1964) (1625) ("Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium").
45. Kristen Boon, Coining a New Jurisdiction: The Security Council as Economic
Peacekeeper, 41 VAND. J. TRANST'L L. 991, 1017 (2008) [hereinafter Boon, Coining a New
Jurisdiction].
46. See, e.g., Behrami and Saramati v. France, ECHR App. No. 71412/01, para. 20
(May 2, 2007) (discussing the difference between the positive and negative peace).
[Vol. 31:57
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obligations that inure with the recognition and enforcement of
economic and social rights, the establishment of a durable peace is
widely perceived to include humanitarian aid, economic
reconstruction, the provision of essential food and medical care,
and even the creation of institutions to administer justice and
address accountability for past atrocities." As the President of the
Security Council stated, "peace is not only the absence of conflict,
but that it requires a positive, dynamic, participatory
,, 48
process ....
This fuller understanding of the contours of peace has
emerged recently, 9 no doubt influenced by the fragmentation of
the concept of war." Nonetheless, it informs international
interventions because states enduring civil wars or engaged in
international conflict often lack the political infrastructure needed
47. See id. See also W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace:
Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World
Politics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 16, 21-22 (1998) (defining "peace").
48. The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc.S/PRST/2000/25 (July 20, 2000). See also S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (stressing the importance of the participation and involvement
of civilians, especially women, in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace
and security); S.C. Res. 1645, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005) ("Emphasizing
the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict
peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace .... ")
(emphasis in original). The Red Cross has adopted a similar definition: "The Red Cross
does not view peace simply as the absence of war, but rather as a dynamic process of
cooperation among all states- and peoples; cooperation founded on freedom,
independence, national sovereignty, equality, respect of human rights, as well a.s a fair and
equitable distribution of resources to meet the needs of peoples." Yves Sandoz, The Red
Cross and Peace: Realities and Limits, 3 J. PEACE RESEARCH 287, 295 n.2 (1987).
49. The closest international organs have come to defining peace is to attempt to
define aggression. The 1974 General Assembly Resolution on Aggression and the ICJ
decisions in the Nicaragua and Corfu cases consider aggression to be the "use of armed
force" by a state against the sovereignty of another state. Definition of Aggression, G.A.
Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A19890 (Dec. 14, 1974); Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 112 (June 27); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v Alb.), 1949 I.C.J..4, 28-30 (Apr. 9).
50. War no longer requires active combat. Consider for example, the Cold War, the
war on terrorism, and the war between South Korea and North Korea-all examples of
situations termed "war," but in fact defined by the absence of active fighting. See
Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 283, 284-87 (1987); BLUM, supra note 6, at 8. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE VOL. II WAR AND NEUTRALITY 56 (1906) (defining
war as a "contention between two or more States through their armed forces for the
purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor
pleases").
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
to resolve their disputes.5" Indeed, some of the most important
work of the international community today involves ad pacem
activities of peacebuilding and reconstruction.5"
What should be done about the inadequacy of the law
applicable to war-to-peace transitions? The concept of jus post
bellum requires a conversation about what can be carried over
from the law of occupation itself and what norms should apply
after the in bello period between conflict and peace, and during
the peacebuilding process itself. 3 Jus post bellum is, by definition,
a law of transition."4 It does not, and cannot, share the legal
presumption in the law of occupation that the status quo ante be
restored. Moreover, it builds on the positive concept of peace
creating obligations for entities exercising public authority that go
beyond the absence of armed conflict. A jus post bellum must
therefore reconcile inherent conflicts between the occupiers' or
the UN's desire to transform and improve conflict-ridden states,
and the right of self-determination of states themselves. " As
Michael Reisman notes, a ceasefire is not enough; rather, we must
create the basis for the permanent cessation of conflict. 56
Three alternatives have emerged to the conundrum thus
exposed: (1) incorporate human rights norms into the law of
occupation and the mandates of 1Os in order to expand
international human rights law (IHRL) protections; 7 (2) use the
UN Security Council's exceptional powers to modify the law of
51. FOx, HUMANITARIAN-OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 45.
52. See generally Mats Berdal, The Security Council & Peacekeeping, in THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE
1945 175, 193 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the evolution of Security
Council peacekeeping missions and the surge in UN peace operations after 2003).
53. Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum, Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 311, 335 (2008) [hereinafter Stahn, Jus Post Bellum].
54. Id. See also Mark Freeman & Drazan Djukic, Jus Post Bellum and Transitional
Justice, in JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO
PEACE 213, 214 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008) (discussing the "transition"
in transitional justice).
55. See Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 24, at 580; JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-30 (2d ed. 2006).
56. Reisman, supra note 47, at 16. See also Major Richard P. Dimeglio, The Evolution
of the Just War Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 146 (2005) ("It
is of little practical value.., to justly engage in war and successfully terminate a conflict,
yet allow conditions to remain that permit violence and aggression to again erupt.").
57. See generally Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 24.
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occupation on a case-by-case basis;58 or (3) carve out a new
category of law, a jus post bellum, to develop norms that will
govern the formation of peace." I will briefly examine the first two
approaches to demonstrate why human rights law and Security
Council involvement are only partial solutions, and conclude by
advocating for the third option of a jus post bellum, in which I
draw upon the strengths of the first two alternatives.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE LAW OF OCCUPATION IN
TRANSITIONAL SITUATIONS
A. The Role of Human Rights
IHL is typically considered lex specialis, which replaces the
laws of general application in times of peace.6o According to this
traditional conception, IHL applies during wartime, while IHRL
applies during peacetime. 6' A modified version of this argument is
that human rights law should only serve the subsidiary function of
clarifying concepts of IHL that are in need of specification.62 From
a temporal standpoint, this special status of IHL is significant: the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 predate major human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights of
1966. Only the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
which are less widely ratified than the Conventions, hint at the
relevance of human rights. 63 Thus the lex specialis approach gives
short shrift to the role of human rights in wartime situations.
Some international law scholars believe the traditional view
has been thoroughly repudiated, whether because IHRL has a
wider scope of application than the laws of war or because of
58. See Scheffer, supra note 35, at 852; Robert Cryer, The Security Council and
International Humanitarian Law, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 245, 273 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., British
Institute of Int'l and Comp. L. 2006).
59. See generally Stahn, Jus Post Bellum, supra note 53.
60. See generally William A. Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The
Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the
Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISR. L. REV. 592 (2007) (explaining and critiquing the
lex specialis theory as applied to international humanitarian law).
61. Wolff Heintschel Von Heinegg, Factors in War to Peace Transitions, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 868 (2004).
62. Id. at 872.
63. See generally Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 24
(discussing the ways in which IHL incorporates human rights).
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recent judicial decisions that find that IHL does not displace
human rights law. ' The International Court of Justice (ICJ),65 the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),' the
European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),6 7 and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (HRC) 6  have all acknowledged the
application of IHRL to belligerent occupiers. In addition to these
international courts, the House of Lords in England has
recognized IHRL in extraterritorial occupations-specifically the
occupation of Iraq.69 Nonetheless, others, most notably those
within the U.S. government, have contended that international
64. See id. at 590-91; John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The
Application of International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation and
Peace Operations, 39 VAND. 'J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1447, 1448 (2006); Steven R. Ratner,
Foreign Occupation and International Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 695, 704 (2005) (discussing The Case on the Wall); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 31, The Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 1 11, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31].
65. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Reports 226, 25 (July 8) (announcing the Court's opinion that the ICCPR's
protections do not cease during wartime); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. Reports IT 104-113 (July 9)
(acknowledging that the ICCPR is applicable outside of a state's territory to acts of an
occupying state committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction); Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 1
(Dec. 19) (holding the ICCPR and other human rights treaties applicable to Uganda's
armed occupation of the Democratic Republic of Congo).
66. See, e.g., Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L.N/II.85, doc.9 rev. (1999) (holding that human rights laws were violated by
U.S. armed forces operating in Grenada).
67. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (holding that the
application of the European Convention on Human Rights is not limited to the national
territory of the High Contracting Parties); Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
335, 71 (2001) (holding that European Convention applies where the occupier, "through
the effective control of the relevant territory.., as a consequence of military
occupation... exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by [the
occupied territory's] Government").
68. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 64, 10 (asserting that "a State party
must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [ICCPR] to anyone within the power
or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party").
69. See Al Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), 287-88
(holding that the Convention did not apply to the actions of the British troops on patrol,
but that it did apply to the individual detained in a British military prison).
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human rights law has no application during belligerent
occupations. 7o
My purpose here is not to retrace these arguments, but rather
to posit that IHRL applies in situations of war and peace, and
informs IHL during times of conflict. 71 The interesting inquiry then
is where human rights are useful and relevant in war-to-peace
transitions, and thus in jus post bellum. Five lessons are apparent
from recent occupations and peacebuilding missions: (1) human
rights create limits on the exercise of governmental authority;72 (2)
human rights can inform the positive content of laws;7" (3) some
human rights are non-derogable and must be respected even in
emergency situations, such as during an occupation or transition
where security is not consolidated;74 (4) human rights can influence
peacekeeping mandates, setting priorities and goals for the
outcome of the intervention and fill the gaps in the law of
belligerent occupation; 75 and (5) if some individuals are considered
not to fall within the categories of protected persons as laid down
in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, human rights protections
may relate to their situations. 76
70. For example Michael Dennis of the State Department, speaking in his individual
capacity, stated that human rights treaties do not generally apply extraterritorially during
occupation. See Michael Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially
During Times of Armed'Conflict and Military Occupations, 100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
86, 86 (2006).
71. See supra note 67 and accompany text.
72. See Nigel D. White, Towards a Strategy for Human Rights Protection in Post-
Conflict Situations, in THE UN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS 463,
465 (Nigel D. White & Dirk Klaasen eds., 2005); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 36-37 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the relationship between the state and human
rights generally); JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO NATION-
BUILDING 65, 76 (2007) (noting the relevance of human rights to the military and police
and the frequent violation of international standards on detentions).
73. See Fox, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing the
norms of physical integrity, equality and pluralism that are now seen to inform a
government's obligations towards its citizens); CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE:
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 198 (2007) (discussing how human rights
obligations in peace agreements inform and legitimize national constitutions).74. See International Covenant -on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6-8, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR states that non-derogable rights
include the right to life, the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, and the right to be free from slavery. See also Roberts, What is a Military
Occupation?, supra note 28, at 250, n.6.
75. White, supra note 72, at 28-29; Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation,
supra note 24, at 601.
76. Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 24, at 601.
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Human rights inform the contours of a modern peace in a
myriad of ways. They create universally relevant standards for
post-conflict reconstruction given their independent status and
reach." They also contribute to a state's legitimacy and stability,
even if respect for human rights and good government are not
requirements of statehood. 78 Moreover, the obligation to respect
and ensure international human rights standards has created a
presumption with regard to applicable law; prior law is presumed
to remain in force unless it is inconsistent with IHRL.79 It is no
longer realistic to exclude human rights from occupation or nation-
building, as they will set the stage for the order that follows. As
such, human rights are vital to jus post bellum, but they are not in
and of themselves sufficient, as shown below.
B. Security Council Resolutions in Post Bellum Situations
The Security Council's extensive involvement in Iraq has
been held up as a second possible source of jus post bellum, in that
the Council showed its willingness to adapt and vary the law of
occupation on a case-by-case basis. Because Chapter VII Security
Council resolutions take precedence over other provisions of
international law, the Security Council can alter the obligations of
the occupiers by tailoring IHL to the situation at hand.8 Rudiger
Wolfrum, for example, has argued that Security Council
involvement is more effective in preventing the abuse of an
occupant's powers than a watered-down IHL that merely expands
the discretionary powers of a belligerent occupant.8 In other
words, there is strong support for the proposition that the
multilateralization of an occupation is the best way to ensure
political legitimacy, sustained economic reconstruction, and the
creation of durable peace.82
The key inquiry, however, is whether the Security Council's
involvement in Iraq should be viewed as good precedent for
77. Id. at 466.
78. CRAWFORD, supra note 55, at 131, 148 (noting that good government is not a
criterion for statehood-violations of human rights do not call into question the State as
such).
79. Shraga, supra note 12, at 488-89.
80. Security Council resolutions have this exceptional status by virtue of Article 103
of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 103.
81. RODIGER WOLFRUM, UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 1147-
61 (1995).
82. Harris, supra note 25, at 38.
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foundational norms of a jus post bellum. Security Council
Resolution 1483 acknowledged the status of the United States and
the United Kingdom as occupying powers in Iraq, while creating
some exceptions to the restrictions inherent in the law of
occupation. For example, the Security Council overrode certain
conservationist principles by authorizing economic reconstruction,
legal reform, and the creation of a new representative
government.8' The Security Council also promoted the welfare of
the Iraqi people through the establishment of a Development
Fund for Iraq, and it encouraged the entry of the World Bank and
IMF into Iraq, enlisting their support and assistance in economic
strategies. 4 In addition, the Council set standards for the
safekeeping of cultural property, and made disarmament a priority
for the occupying powers, consequently modifying and updating
the law of occupation. 85
The Security Council's involvement in Iraq has, nonetheless,
met with mixed reviews. On the positive side, the Security Council
broadened the CPA's presence to include international interests 86
while at the same time reaffirm that the sovereignty of Iraq lay in
the Iraqi people themselves. 87 Furthermore, the UN had a limited
mandate, and presumably fewer conflicts of interest with the local
population than the typical occupying power. 8 The Security
Council's recommendations were tailored to the situation in Iraq,
and took into account the dominant role of oil in the national
economy. A trust fund was created to manage the proceeds of the
oil industry for example, which constitutes 90 percent of Iraq's
83. S.C. Res. 1483, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (appointing a Special
Representative to undertake these tasks in coordination with the CPA). See also G.H.
Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 273 (2005) (noting that the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq relied on Security Council Resolution 1483, as well as other
substantive international standards, as a basis for its regulations).
84. Boon, Open for Business, supra note 19, at 539.
85. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 83, 8.
86. DOBBINS, supra note 72, at 138 (discussing the UN mandate which shows that the
international community agrees the operation is legally and morally justified).
87. Harris, supra note 25.
88. WILDE, supra note 34; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Post-War Settlement in
Iraq: The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and General International Law, 8 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 307, 309 (2003) (quoting the Representative of France during a
debate on Resolution 1483, who said that the broad authorities vested in the occupying
powers are obligations erga omnes, in that they "are objective in nature; they objectively
protect certain non-state transcendent interests and impose respective obligations on all
states involved in occupation").
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national revenues. 89  The Council's involvement thus lent
legitimacy and logistical assistance to the reconstruction exercise
in Iraq, given its considerable expertise the field. 0
On the other hand, the Security Council was criticized for its
involvement as well. The Security Council was perceived by some
as a rubber stamp for U.S. ambitions or as partial in its own right
due to the legacy of the Oil for Food scandal, and the decade of
harsh sanctions against Iraq.9 Furthermore, the Council did not
require that the new government in Iraq be created on the basis of
democratic elections, which was a sine qua non in the view of
many. 92 The Council's resolutions were not explicit enough to give
good guidance on exceptions to the law of occupation; for
.example, the Council recognized the United Kingdom and United
States as occupying powers, but did not acknowledge or define the
role of other coalition members such as Romania and Poland. The
Council's unilateral declaration that the occupation of Iraq ended
upon dissolution of the CPA on June 30, 2004 similarly flew in the
face of black letter law, because under Article 43 of the Hague
Convention a belligerent occupation continues as long as the
occupying forces are in effective control of the occupied territory. "
There are limits on the Security Council's ability to supply
general legal norms in the occupation and peacebuilding context.
The Security Council is hampered by its selectivity with regard to
the situations it engages in, Its activist involvement in Iraq need
only be compared to its passive approach in Zimbabwe, Darfur,
and Rwanda, to illustrate that intervention by the Security Council
is a function of political calculations and consensus. 9' The Security
89. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 83, T 20.
90. See DAVID M. MALONE, THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE OVER IRAQ
POLITICS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1980-2005 (2006).
91. Andrew Mack, Oil-for-Food Scandal: The Security Council is to Blame, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., May 12,2004.
92. Orakhelashvili, supra note 88, at 312.
93. S.C. Res. 1546, T 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) ("Welcomes that, also
by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will
cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty") (emphasis in original). Cf.
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 35,273 (2008).
94. See also Daniel Thurer, Current Challenges to the Law of Occupation,
INTERNATIONAL COMMIrEE OF THE RED CROSS, Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/occupation-statement- 2 11105. See generally
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Votes, U.N. Doc.
SC/9396 (July 11, 2008); S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004); S.C. Res.
1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May
17, 1994).
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Council makes law of exceptions, but it is unrealistic to expect it to
consistently and impartially intervene where the interests of its
permanent members are involved.5 This structural drawback is
compounded by the fact that Security Council resolutions are
notoriously vague due to the process of negotiations and political
compromise that ensues. 96 Moreover, the absence of neutral bodies
to interpret Security Council resolutions leaves little room for
outside clarification, and may ultimately give occupiers under
Security Council regimes the upper hand. ' Despite the Council's
critical role in multilateral interventions therefore, its attempts to
rewrite the law of occupation should.not be viewed as a source of
consistent or impartial norms applicable to the transition between
war and peace.
VI. Jus POSTBELLUM AS A FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION
IHL, IHRL, and Security Council resolutions provide useful
points of reference for a jus post bellum. These instruments
illustrate the interwoven (although sometimes competing) threads
of justice, peace, self determination, and democracy.98 In addition,
they add content to the transitional roles and obligations of the
international community in light of the positive peace. Although
there is some overlap between governance under the law of
occupation in bello, and the exercise of public powers post bellum,
a key difference between the in bello and post bellum regimes is
that the latter abandons the conservationist principle. There is
flexibility in IHL to accommodates changes to laws under Article
43 of the Hague Convention and Article 64 of Geneva IV, but it is
generally agreed that they should not be distorted to promote
95. Marten Zwanenburg, Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and
the Law of Occupation, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 745, 763-64 (2004).
96. Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175,
189 (2005).
97. See Zwanenburg, supra note 95, at 767-68 (because the extensive obligations
placed on occupiers under Geneva IV are less than those contained in ad hoc Security
Council resolutions).
98. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General: The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, 1 (Aug.
23, 2004) [hereinafter The Rule of Law and Transnational Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies].
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transformations that undercut self-determination or change the
fabric of society.'
A central challenge is to define the norms, obligations, and
scope of a jus post bellum. Jus post bellum is potentially very broad
if one includes all of the intermediate states between active
conflict and durable peace. 100 Scholars have suggested that jus post
bellum should incorporate various norms applicable to war-to-
peace transitions, including the right to reparations, fairness and
representation in peace settlements, refugee return, the
establishment of the rule of law, and criminal justice mechanisms
for establishing accountability after war. 10 In my view, however, a
narrower frame is preferable. Jus post bellum should apply to the
exercise of governmental and public powers by external entities
such as 1Os and foreign states. While this approach may exclude
certain components of the general peacebuilding process, it will
leave settled law in place on issues like the law of occupation,
refugees, and international criminal law. A significant contribution
of a jus post bellum would therefore be to fill existing gaps and
establish a uniform legal regime to govern the exercise of public
authority during transformative occupations and war-to-peace
transitions. It would be broader than the traditional concept of
belligerent occupation in a number of ways. First, it would apply to
all actors exercising public authority, including 1Os like the UN.
Second, jus post bellum would go beyond the temporal scope of
the law of occupation, by applying to transitions from war to peace
beyond periods of effective control, so as to inform the many
challenges that occur as peace is consolidated. 102 Third, it would
99. DINSTEIN, supra note 93, paras. 252-270; Marco Sassoli, Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations and Peac Operations in the Twenty-First Century, Int'l Humanitarian L. Res.
Initiative 1, available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/sassoli.pdf.
100. Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist, 20 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 571,573-574 (2007).
101. See Gary J. Bass, Jus Post Bellum, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 384, 390-91 (2004);
Harris, supra note 25, at 2-3 (discussing elements of human rights, transparency, and
shared authority); BRIAN OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN
PERSPECTIVE 232, 227-28 (2000) (focusing on war crimes trials); Robert E. Williams, Jr. &
Dan Caldwell, Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace, 7 INT'L
STUD. PERSP. 309, 309 (2006) (discussing the human rights dimensions of jus post bellum);
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, supra note
98, at 5-6 (providing an operational perspective of the rule of law during peace from the
UN).
102. See Stahn, Jus Post Bellum, supra note 53 at 344 (suggesting a case-by-case
analysis, such as looking at the facts surrounding the end of hostilities or a Security
Council resolution). On the difficult question of what an occupation begins and ends, see
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provide parameters for the depth of intervention, in light of the
right to self-determination.
While the scope and content of jus post bellum are
developing, in my view there are four emerging norms. These are:
(1) accountability; (2) good economic governance; (3) stewardship;
and (4) proportionality in intervention, to safeguard self-
determination. These principles constitute emerging norms of
customary international law that are increasingly respected by, and
consequently in the process of becoming binding on, states and
lOs. 103
A. Accountability
Transitional governments are by their very nature unelected
and thus not subject to the typical constraints of a democratic
system; still they must meet basic criteria of accountability in order
to be perceived as legitimate. '" Edmund Burke wrote that
accountability is the "very essence of every trust," 10. and this has
borne true in the growing demands that specific institutional
mechanisms must be created to hold power holders to account.'6
Accountability in governance is now the sine qua non of
international administrations, even in transitional situations.
Despite the difficult local conditions that obtain after conflict,
authorities that do not respect basic principles of transparency and
accountability have been widely criticized and forced to reform
Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation, Tel Aviv Univ.
Law School Faculty Papers No. 93 (2008) (on file with author). For example, neither the
Third nor Fourth Geneva Convention provide any legal basis for continuing the detention
of prisoners post-transfer, as the conventions require that prisoners must either be
released or charged with a crime and tried. See Geneva III, supra note 27, arts. 118-119;
Geneva IV, supra note 5, art. 133.
103. See Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L' & COMP. L.Q. 850, 856-59 (1989) (arguing that acts of.
international organizations, particularly the UN, contribute to and are reflected in the
practice and opinio juris of states, both of which are central elements in the formulation of
customary international law). The International Law Commission listed the following as
classical forms of evidence of customary norms: treaties, decisions of national and
international courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national
legal advisors, and practice of international organizations. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 368-372, U.N. Doc.
A/1316/SER.A./1950 (July 1950).
104. See id. at 143, 153.
105. See WILDE, supra note 34, at 392.
106. Erica De Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable, 9 GERMAN L.J.
1987, 1987 (2008).
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their practices. 107 The outcry against the CPA in Iraq over its
treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib is an example of this
phenomenon. 10 8 Likewise, in Kosovo and East Timor, the interim
administrations were accused of various human rights violations
such as arbitrary detentions. Because rights of judicial review were
limited, ombudspersons were one of the mechanisms created to
investigate the complaints in response.
Although there are no legal conventions setting out the
contents of international accountability, 10 accountability can be
understood as requiring that decision making be based on
reasoned account, and that duties are owed to individuals affected
by the exercise of that power, not only to the entities that have
delegated their power, such as member states of an international
organization. Under this model, accountability would be owed
by the foreign presence to the accountees (the local population) by
recognizing the right of accountees to demand the accountor
render account for its.performance, on the basis that the accountor
has the authority to impose sanctions. 12 The transitional justice
movement, in contrast, has sought to create accountability within
populations, by making the population accountable to itself for
past injustices. The draft articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations and certain national decisions limiting
the scope of privileges and immunities of 1Os involved in
governance activities demonstrate the developing legal bases for
holding power holders to account in transitional situations. 1" Such
107. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS,
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS, AND STATE BUILDING 153 (2004) [hereinafter
CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE].
108. Although Dinstein is right to note that occupation is based on coercion, and so
"democracy is not of any functional relevance to the running of an occupied territory,"
DINSTEIN, supra note 93, para. 80, there are limits to the exercise of this power, as a
matter of law and morality. See REED BRODY, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE?
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 1, 7, 17, 87 (2005),
available at http:/[hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405.
109. CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE, supra note 107, at 147.
110. Gerhard Hafner, Accountability of International Organizations, 97 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 236, 236 (2003) (stating that "accountability" is neither an expression of
the common law nor the civil law, and thus has no accepted legal meaning).
111. De Wet, supra note 106, at 1987-89.
112. Richard Stewart, Accountability, Participation, and the Problem of Disregard in
Global Regulatory Governance, at 16 (2008) (draft on file with author).
113. See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm
(specifically the rules on attribution to international organizations). See also
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principles could be put into practice by national courts, or by the
Security Council itself, through the creation of expert review
mechanisms, modeled on the World Bank's Inspection Panel. 
1 4
Accountability is to be distinguished from transparency in
that the latter requires that affected constituents have access to
information regarding the manner in which normative decisions
are taken. 115 Transparency is not an accountability mechanism in
and of itself because it does not possess the structural mutual
obligations of an accountability model, and so is a necessary, but
not a sufficient condition for accountability. Nonetheless, the
provision of information through transparency mechanisms can
promote the free flow of information, and strengthen
responsiveness promoting practices, including competition, general
political mechanisms, social practices and incentives. 116
B. Good Economic Governance
Good economic governance is a second pillar of jus post
bellum. Economic reconstruction is now a standard component of
peacebuilding operations and occupations because poverty,
mismanagement of natural resources, and food or currency crises
can create conflict. 117 The connection between economic stability
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision in Case U 9/00 (regarding the
law on the State Border Service), Nov. 3, 2000.
114. Similar proposals have been forwarded with regards to Security Council black lists
on terrorist financing. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The UN Security Council and the Rule
of Law (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law Research Paper No. 08-57, 2008) para. 47, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279849.
115. De Wet, supra note 106, at 1991.
116. See generally Stewart, supra note 112..
117. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1037, $ 11(f), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (Jan. 15, 1996) (Eastern
Slavonia); S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 94, $ 11, 13, 17 (establishing the UN Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), which required the international administration to "[support] the
reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction"); S.C. Res. 1272,
$ 2(f), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (similarly requiring the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) "[t]o assist in the establishment of conditions
for sustainable development"); S.C. Res. 1419, % 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES1419 (June 26, 2002)
(Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1770, 2(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1770 (Aug. 10, 2007). In the
Congo, the Council called on member states to provide long-term assistance for social and
economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, drawing on the assistance of international
financial institutions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1379, 8(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20,
2001); S.C. Res. 1376, 12, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001); S.C. Res. 1296, 1 16,
U.N. Doc. S[RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1270, 1% 3-4, 8b; 8c, 20, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999); U.K. Dep't for Int'l Dev., The Causes of Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Oct. 2001, at 11, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
conflictsubsaharanafrica.pdf; Slobodanka B. Teodosijevi6, Armed Conflicts and Food
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and durable peace is well established. "' The economic dimensions
of conflict (including the causes of war, the effects of spoilers like
warlords and militias, and economic measures to combat
corruption) are becoming central to contemporary concepts of
collective security. 19
While the history of international regulation of natural
resources is not unblemished (colonial powers often pursued the
exploitation of raw materials), management of natural resources is
now a shared objective of the IFIs and the Security Council in
pursuit of minimizing threats to peace and security in the
international economic system. 120 A specific example of economic
regulation is the management of natural resources, given their
potential to directly fuel the underlying conflict. 2' The Security
Council has thus urged the lawful and transparent exploitation of
natural resources, encouraged "certificate of origin" schemes such
as the Kimberly Process for diamond certification, and now
includes substantive economic objectives in its peacekeeping
mandates. 122 In the peacebuilding context, the Security Council has
underscored the importance of economic rehabilitation and good
Security 6 (Agric. & Dev. Econ. Div., Working Paper No. 03-11, 2003), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/aeO44e/aeO44eOO.pdf.
118. See Paul Collier, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery (Apr. 2006) (unpublished
paper, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-econpco/research/pdfs/IPA-PostConflict
EconomicRecovery.pdf) (noting that typically there is a 39 percent risk that peace will
collapse within the first five years, and a 32 percent risk that it will collapse in the next five
years); Paul Collier, Policy for Post-Conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of Renewed
Conflict 3-4 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 28135, 2000) (stating that the three highest
risks for post-conflict societies are a high dependency on natural resource rents, a
downturn in economic opportunities and ethnic dominance).
119. See generally Boon, Open for Business, supra note 19. See also Laurence Boisson
De Chazournes, Collective Security and Economic Interventionism of the UN- The Need
for a Coherent and Integrated Approach, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 51, 52 (2007) (discussing
emerging practice of integrating economic elements into collective security arrangements);
Augustine Ikelegbe, The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria, 14(2) NORDIC J. AFR. STUD. 208, 210,212 (2005).
120. Wilde, supra note 34, at 334 (colonial legacies). See generally Boon, Coining a
New Jurisdiction, supra note 45.
121. See Rex J. Zedalis, Iraqi Oil and Revenues from Its Sale: A Review of How
Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected the Past and May Shape the Future, 18
FUR. J. INT'L L. 499, 513 (2007).
122. See S.C. Res. 1698, 1$ 6, 10, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1698 (July 31, 2006); Ian
Smillie, What Lessons from the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme?, in PROFITING
FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR 47,47 (Kimberly
Ballentine & Heiko Nitzschke eds., 2005); Boon, Open for Business, supra note 19, at 566.
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economic governance in many regions, including Eastern Slavonia,
Kosovo, East Timor, the Congo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
C. Stewardship
A third principle is stewardship. The concept of stewardship
derives from the mandate system of the League of Nations, and
the special obligations of occupiers to the occupied recognized in
the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions. 124 Whereas
trusteeship was meant to humanize earlier forms of state
colonialism and rein in the impulses of occupiers to transform the
occupied state in their own image, the concept of stewardship does
not have these historical connotations. ' Nonetheless, Ralph
Wilde notes a commonality between occupations, colonial
trusteeships, Mandate and Trusteeship arrangements, and UN
territorial administrations, in that the administrative control by
international actors-whether states or IOs-is over a territorial
unit whose identity is understood as something "other" than that
of the administering actors. 126
In the context of occupation, stewardship require that
administrators respect the rights and safeguard the interests of
inhabitants under their purview. 127 This obligation entails acting in
the best interests of the populations concerned, because local
populations are vulnerable to the risk of misconduct. 128 While
there have been vociferous objections to the colonial overtones of
the trusteeship model, and great criticism of the fanciful nature of
this obligation in the occupation context, 129 the occupation of Iraq
shows the continuing relevance of stewardship duties to jus post
bellum. In Iraq, the Security Council and the CPA deliberately,
recognized the dependence of the people of Iraq on the
international community. The Security Council, for example,
123. See discussion in Boon, Coining a New Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 1032-33.
124. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, supra note 83, at 29-43 (discussing the evolution of
the mandate system, and the shift from governing for outside interests to governing for the
best interests of the population itself).
125. See WILDE, supra note 34, at 318.
126. WILDE, supra note 34, at 356.
127. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 668, 668-69 (7th ed. 1996); Fox, The Occupation of Iraq,
supra note 83, at 319.
128. See RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW TRUSTEESHIP? THE INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF WARTORN TERRITORIES 13-29 (2002).
129. DINSTEIN, supra note 93, para. 81 (noting that in practice, trusteeship has not
worked).
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required the Authority to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people
through the effective administration of the territory .... ,1 30 CPA
Order No. 2 stated that all assets of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party that had
been transferred or acquired were subject to seizure by the CPA
"on behalf and for the benefit of the Iraqi people." 13' As such,
international protection of certain rights and goods, including the
right to sovereignty over natural resources in the period preceding
self-determination, continues to have purchase in post bellum
interventions by states and 1Os. Nonetheless, the scope of
stewardship is limited; it must be of finite duration, be carefully
delineated, and there must be opportunities to hold the power
holder to account, through private rights of action or
accountability mechanisms as defined above.
D. Proportionality
A final principle of jus post bellum is proportionality. The
scope of reforms taken in pursuit of establishment of a durable
peace must be proportionate to the legal end goals of the
occupations or peacebuilding missions in question. Moreover, jus
post bellum must not infringe on the right to self-determination.
Proportionality is a concept central to domestic and international
legal systems. 132 It is also relevant to the post bellum assessment
because it derives from the "just war" doctrine, whereby the
recourse of the resort to force is assessed against the wrongs
committed, and the measures deployed as countermeasures must
be proportionate in turn. 133 Factors that weigh in favor of deeper
intervention include the collapse of central institutions, the
absence of a functioning legal system, and laws that are contrary to
major international human rights treaties. Elements that auger in
favor of a "lighter footprint" by foreign states or -entities will
include a modern legal system, a functioning civil society, a history
of a democratic, elected governance, and respect for human rights
and universal norms.
130. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 83, 4.
131. Coalition Provisional Authority, Dissolution of Entities with Annex A, Order 2,
§ 2 (Aug. 23, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#
Regulations.
132. Boon, Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 324. For the role of proportionality
generally in international law, see Thomas Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures
in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (2008).
133. Franck, supra note 132, at 719.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A primary goal of jus post bellum is durable peace. Conflict
prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and post-conflict
reconstruction have this central goal in common. Identifying the
content of a new jus post bellum thus involves finding a workable
set of principles and emerging customs that provide standards to
address the myriad of challenges arising in war-to-peace
transitions. To be sure, a case-by-case approach will be required in
every situation, and each intervention will present its own
circumstances. Nonetheless, the identification of core norms
applicable to the exercise of public powers in transitional
situations between war and peace will greatly reduce gaps in law
and legitimacy.
The emergence of a jus post bellum has wide-reaching
implications for international law: it shows the evolution of the
concept of collective security and peace, and the relevance of non-
state actors (including 1Os, non-governmental organizations, and
private corporations) to peacebuilding. " Moreover, at a time
when 1Os are promulgating the rule of law externally, it is no
surprise that they are being called to act upon the rule of law
internally. In an immediate sense, post-conflict reconstruction has
exposed weaknesses in the internal legal structures of 1Os, and in
the constitutional theories applicable to the interpretation of their
Charters, given the malleability of doctrines such as implied
powers and amendment by practice. In the longer term, jus post
bellum is likely to reveal that 1Os must confront profound
questions about their relevance and the scope of their mandates in
the twenty-first century as economic globalization and multilateral
approaches to peacebuilding deepen.
Although there is little present momentum for codifying new
instruments in this field, three developments indicate the
consensus that jus post bellum is an important area of activity and
is representative of emerging norms. "' First, the report on the
134. Compare INIS L. CLAUDE JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES 224 (1964) (collective
security is "the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation against
any nation will be met by the combined force of all other nations"), with Boon, Coining a
New Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 1017 (discussing the aspects of collective security that
do not involve the threat or use of force, such as economic threats to the peace).
135. To the extent that interest exists in codifying new norms, it lies in the area of
detention, and has arisen due to criticisms of the standards of treatment of detainees in
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"Responsibility to Protect," written by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, emphasizes
that modern interventions cannot end after military conflict and
should instead contain a "responsibility to rebuild." 136 This
obligation includes the responsibility to implement sustainable
reconstruction and rehabilitation and to prevent the conditions
which led to the conflict from repeating themselves. 117 A second
development of note is the creation of the Peacebuilding
Commission in 2005. 138 This UN organ has a mandate to integrate
peacebuilding strategies from the outset of UN interventions and
is emerging as a coordinating power dedicated to peacebuilding
strategies that have a more representative basis than traditional
UN activities. "' Finally, concerted efforts are underway to explore
the limits of the Security Council's Article 39 jurisdiction and to
define the crime of aggression. Given the interrelated concepts of
war and peace, clarification of the crime of aggression and the
content of international security will add substance to the
obligations of building a durable peace.
Iraq, and the norms governing transitions from an occupation to a Security Council
mandated force.
136. See Int'l Comm'n on Interverntion and State Sovereignty, Report: The
Responsibility to Protect, XI (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-
Report.pdf. See also Stahn, Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Forces, supra
note 3, at 931.
137. INT'L DEv. RESEARCH CTR., THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 40-46 (2001),
available at http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28741-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html; The Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
UN Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). There is less support for the application of the R2P
doctrine in the context of natural disasters. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, Facing up to Our
Responsibilities, THE GUARDIAN, May 12, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/may/12/facinguptoourresponsbilities (discussing the situation in
Burma in 2008).
138. Peacebuilding Comm'n, Working Group on Lessons Learned, Meeting on
Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks, Indicators, and Monitoring Mechanisms,
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pbc-lessons.shtm (follow hyperlink "Summary
Notes of the Chair" corresponding to date 19.09.2007) (Sept. 19, 2007).
139. See, e.g., id.
140. See, e.g., COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, THE ICC AND THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION FACTSHEET, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
CICCFSCrime.ofAggressionFactsheet_engASP 6jan8.pdf (last visited Apr. 17,
2009).
[Vol. 31:57
